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BARNABAS DICKSON*

The Precautionary Principle in CITES:
A Critical Assessment
ABSTRACT
The precautionary principle has become a popular principle in
internationalenvironmental law. In 1994 the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna(CITES) explicitly endorsed the principle, but CITES was

implicitly precautionarylong before that.Both the implicit and the
explicit versions of the precautionaryprincipleendorsed by CITES
are open to the criticism that they rule out the considerationof
factors thatare relevant to wildlie policy. Included in thesefactors
is the impactof conservationpolicies on human communities. This
conclusion is relevantboth to the generalevaluationof CITES and
to any wider consideration of the value of the precautionary

principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1987 the precautionary principle has become a popular
principle in international environmental law.' In 1990 the U.N. Secretary
General remarked that the principle "has been endorsed by all recent
international forums' and in 1992 the principle was incorporated in the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development? But this surge in
popularity was not accompanied by a consensus on the wording of the

-
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1. The early years of this process am well described in James Cameron &Juli Abouchar,
The PrecautionaryPrinciple.A Fundamental Principleof Law and Policyfor the Protectionof the
Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L &COup. L.REv. 1, 1-27 (1991). Some of the more recent
developments are noted in.
James Cameron &Juli Abouchar, The Status of the Precautionary
Principlein InternationalLaw, inTHE PRECAnIONAWY PRV4WU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29,
29-52 (David Freestone &Ellen Hey eds., 1996).
2. James Cameron, The PrecautionaryPrinciple-CoeMeaning, ConstitutionalFramework
and Proceduresfor Implementation, in THE PRECAtrIONARY PmcNCu CONFERECE PAaEs 17,
18 (Institute of Environmental Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia ed.,

1993).

3. Rio Declaration on Environmment and Deelopment, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N.C.ED. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 LLK'874,

879 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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principle. Formulations vary from agreement to agreement.' Due to the
lack of a fixed definition there is still considerable doubt about the policy
implications of the principle.5
International wildlife law has not been an exception to these trends.
The U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, also signed at the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, contains a version of the
precautionary principle in its Preamble; and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)", at
the Ninth Conference of the Parties, held in 1994, passed a resolution
endorsing its own formulation of the principle.' Yet the precise import of
the principle, particularly within CITES, remains unclear. This paper offers
an analysis of the place of the precautionary principle within CITES and
provides a critical assessment of the versions of the principle found there.
Following this introduction the article begins with a brief look at
the different formulations of the precautionary principle that have been
incorporated in agreements that are not specifically concerned with
wildlife. Distinctions are made between the action-guiding and
deliberation-guiding versions of the principle, and between more determinate and less determinate formulations. These two distinctions are then
employed in the survey of CITES. This survey includes an examination of
the possibility that CITES implicitly incorporated the precautionary
principle long before it explicitly endorsed it. It is argued that there is one

4. This is illustrated by the formulations of the precautionary principle that appear in

agreements to which the United Kingdom is party. A useful list of these formulations has been
compiled in Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK, in
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUrIONARY PRINCIPLE, 229, 243-246 (Timothy O'Riordan & James

Cameron eds., 1994).

5. It has been suggested that the implementation of the precautionary principle is now
the "key issue" that has to be resolved. See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and

Development of the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 3,14 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996).
6. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5,1992, S. TRATY Doc. 20 (1993), 31 I.L.M. 818, 824 (1992).
7.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,

Mar. 3,1973, 27 US.T. 1087,993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. The treaty is made up of a
Preamble and twenty-five Articles. Wild species can be listed on the three Appendices to the
treaty. The Conference of the Parties to CITES meets approximately biennially. Resolutions
passed at these conferences determine how the treaty is to operate. These resolutions are each
given a number. The integer to the left of the period indicates at which conference the
resolution was passed. For example, Conf. 9.24 is the 24th resolution passed at the Ninth

Conference of the Parties. Some of the resolutions have Annexes. For an invaluable guide to
CITES, see WmLEM WNm

, THE EVOLUTION oF CITES (1992).

8. Criteriafor Amendment of Appendices I and II, Resolution of the Conference of the
Parties, Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Fort

Lauderdale 1994) [hereinafter Conf. 9.24).
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respect, of considerable importance, in which CITES is implicitly precautionary. Before moving to the critical assessment of the precautionary
principle in CITES, a third distinction is introduced. This is a distinction
between interpreting policy standards as rules and interpreting them as
principles.
The assessment itself contends that the versions of the precautionary principle endorsed by CIES, whether implicitly or explicitly, are open
to the criticism that they appear to rule out incorporating factors that
ought, rationally, to be considered. More specifically, they rule out the
consideration of, firstly, the reasons against restricting international trade
in wild species, and, secondly, the alternative means of achieving the goal
of species conservation. It is pointed out that this criticism calls into
question some of the founding assumptions of CITES.
II. TWO DISTINCTIONS
It is possible to make two helpful distinctions to guide one through
the plethora of formulations of the precautionary principle that are found
in international agreements. All versions of the principle offer guidance on
how to respond when there is some evidence, but not proof, that a human
practice is damaging the environment, The first distinction concerns the
general nature of that guidance.
One version of the principle calls for action to be taken against the
practice that may be causing environmental damage. This type can be
termed the "action-guiding" version of the principle. This version is found
most frequently in agreements dealing with marine pollution. For example,
the formulation of the principle that is offered in the 1989 report of the
Nordic Council's International Conference on the Pollution of the Seas is
an instance of this version." The report speaks of:
the need for an effective precautionary approach, with that
important principle intended to safeguard the marine
ecosystem by, amongst other things, eliminating and preventing pollution emissions where there is reason to believe
that damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even
where there is inadequate or inconclusive scientific evidence
to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.1

9. Nordic Council'sInternationalConference on Pollutionof the Seas, GREENPEACE 28, annex
2 (1990). Other examples can be found in: Second InternationalConference on the Protectionof the
North Sea, MinisterialDeclaration arts. VI1, XVi), XVI(1) (London, Nov. 1987); ParisCommission

Recommendation 89/1, On the Principleof PrecautionaryAction, 22 June, 1989, in GREENPEACE
PAPER 28, annex 1, at 23,23-24, (1990) [Hereinafter GREENFEACE PAPER 281.

10. Nordic Council, InternationalConferenceon Pollution of the Seas, supranote 9, at 27.
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The second version of the precautionary principle simply stipulates
that the fact that it is uncertain whether a practice is causing environmental
harm should not be used as a reason for not taking action against that
practice. This version does not call directly for action. Rather, it restricts
what can be considered as a reason for inaction. It will therefore be termed
the "deliberation-guiding" version. Instances of this version are found in
many of the more general environmental agreements." It appears, for
example, in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation."
This version of the precautionary principle is less stringent than the
action-guiding version. For the action-guiding version requires that
something be done in response to the threat, while the deliberation-guiding
version does not.
It might be objected that this distinction between the two versions
cannot be maintained because deliberation is itself a type of action and
therefore both versions of the principle are action-guiding. However, this
objection misses the point in that the action referred to in the label "actionguiding" is action against the practice that may be causing environmental
damage. It is certainly the case that deliberation is itself a type of action.
Indeed, the type of institutional deliberation about policy that is in question
here will almost certainly involve actions, however narrow the meaning of
"action." Nevertheless, the deliberation-guiding version, unlike the actionguiding version, does not call for action against the practice that may be
causing damage. It simply places constraints on what can be considered in
the course of deliberation about whether to undertake this sort of action.
Thus, the terms "action-guiding" and "deliberation-guiding" remain rough
but appropriate labels for the two versions of the precautionary principle.
The second distinction is one of degree. Formulations of the
precautionary principle are more or less determinate. There are several
aspects to the degree of specificity of the principle. A formulation of the
principle may be concerned with a more or less specific part of the

11. See,e.g., Bergen Conference, Bergen MinisterialDeclarationon SustainableDevelopment in
the ECE Region art. 7 (May 16, 1990); United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change (May 9,1992), 31 ILM. 849,851-52

(1992).
12. Rio Declaration,supranote 3, at 879.
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environment; it may be concerned with a more or less specifically defined
type of threat; or it may be concerned with more or less specific types of
action for responding to the threat.
Judged against two of these three criteria, the formulation found
in the Rio Declaration is clearly less determinate than the Nordic Council's
formulation. The Rio formulation is concerned with all parts of the
environment, it does not mention specific threats and it makes no
assumptions about what type of response is appropriate (other than that
it must be cost-effective). The Nordic Council's formulation, in contrast, is
concerned specifically with marine ecosystems and the threat from
pollution. It does not specify what action should be undertaken in response
to the threat, although it does require that pollution emissions must be
eliminated and prevented. Equipped with these two distinctions, we can
now examine the place of the precautionary principle in CITES.
III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN CITES
The precautionary principle was explicitly endorsed for the first
time by CITES in a resolution at the Ninth Conference of the Parties in
1994. This resolution, known as Conf. 9.24, dealt with the criteria for
amending Appendices Iand IL'*But it has been suggested that even before
1994, CITES implicitly embodied the principle both in the original articles
of the treaty, and the early resolutions."' Before turning to Conf. 9.24 itself,
three possible interpretations of the implicit nature of the precautionary
principle are examined.
The first respect in which CITES might be implicitly precautionary
concerns the main thrust of Articles II, M and IV of the treaty. Article HI
specifies the circumstances in which species should be listed on either
Appendix I or Appendix II of the treaty. Article 11(1) states "Appendix I
shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or may be
affected by trade."' s Article 11(2)(a) states that Appendix 11 shall include "all
species which although not necessarily threatened with extinction may
become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict
regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival."16
Articles M and IV spell out the implications of a listing on these Appendices. An Appendix I listing requires a nearly complete ban on international

13. Conf. 9.24, supranote 8.
14. See David Favre, Debates within the CITES Community: What Directionfor the Future?,
33 NAT. RESOURCES J.875, 895 (1993).
15. CITES, supranote 7, art. 11(1) (emphasis added).
16. Id., art. H(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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trade in the species." An Appendix II listing requires regulation of this
trade. 8 Taken together, these three articles require action to be taken
against trade in affected species, even when it is not certain that trade is
harming the species; in this sense they may reasonably be said to embody
the action-guiding version of the precautionary principle. Moreover, this
implicit version of the principle is a determinate one. The concern is
specifically with wild species, it is assumed that there is a threat from
international trade, and it is held that the appropriate response is to place
some constraints, of greater or lesser severity, on that trade. Thus, the key
articles of the treaty, which define how its aims are to be achieved, are
implicitly precautionary.
The second respect in which the precautionary principle is thought
to be implicitly present in CITES concerns some of the specific clauses in
Articles I and W. As just indicated, these articles stipulate in what
circumstances, if any, species listed on Appendices I or I may be traded.
Both articles require a "non-detriment" finding, and for this reason they
have been said to embody the precautionary principle.19 For example,
Article W(2) states that an export permit for an Appendix II species will
only be granted if, along with other conditions, "a Scientific Authority of
the State of Export has advised that such export will not be detrimental to
the survival of the species."" The precise import of this clause is not dear.21
The clause apparently requires a demonstration that trade is safe before
allowing it to proceed. This is a stiffer requirement than that found even in
the action-guiding version of the principle. That version requires action
against a practice even if it has not been proved to be harmful. But the
practice does not have to be proved to be safe before it is allowed to
proceed. However, the non-detriment clauses do seem to take this further
step, at least in regard to species that have been listed on Appendices I and
IL Thus, the claim that the non-detriment clauses embody the precautionary principle is mistaken. It cannot even be maintained that these clauses
are "in the spirit" of the precautionary principle, for the rationale of that
principle lies in the recognition that policy decisions may have to be made

17. See id., art MI.
18. See id., art IV.
19. This has been described as the "most important" respect in which CITES is implicitly
precautionary. See Favre, supra note 14, at 895.
20. CITES, supranote 7, art IV(2).
21. For example, it does not specify what will count as "a Scientific Authority of the State
of Export," nor does it require that the advice be well-founded.

Spring 1999]

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN CITES

in situations of uncertainty. But to require proof of safety is to ignore the
insight that proof (of either harm or safety) may not be available.'
The third possibility is that the endorsement of asymmetric listing
criteria represents an implicit incorporation of the precautionary
principlen At the First Conference of the Parties to CITES, held in Berne in
1976, two resolutions (Conf. 1.1 and Conf. 1.2) passed that attempted to
specify, in more detail than the original articles, the criteria for adding
species to and removing them from Appendices I and 1. These are
commonly referred to as the "Berne Criteria." The second of these
resolutions introduced asymmetric listing criteria.
The original articles, by saying nothing specifically about the
criteria for removing a species from either Appendix, implied that in order
to de-list a species it was sufficient that the criteria for listing were no
longer satisfied. In that situation the criteria for listing and de-listing were
symmetrical. Or, put another way, the criteria for de-listing were the mirror
image of the criteria for listing. The second resolution [hereinafter Conf.
1.2] changed this. A In order to de-list, it was insufficient that the criteria for
listing were no longer satisfied. Conf. 1.2 required that additional criteria
must be satisfied if a species was to be de-listed.rs This meant that the

22. Relatedly, it is often remarked that the precautionary principle involves a shift in the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contempomry
Signoiamn ofthe Preautionary Princple, n WrE1G THE PReCAUrIONARY PRINCLE, supra
note 4, at 12, 15-16. If this is simply a way of indicating that the principle recommends, in
effect, a shift in the level of evidence that isneeded before action is undertaken against a
possibly dangerous practice, then the remark is unexceptionable. But if it is being suggested
that the principle requires possibly dangerous practices to be proved to be safe, then it is
mistaken. Even the action-guiding version of the principle does not require that.
23. Favre claims that it is implicitly precautionary in this sense. See Favre, supra note 14,
at 895.
24. See WUNSrEKE, supra note 7, at 17, citing Criteria for the Deletion of Species and

Other Taxa from Appendices I and H, Resolution of the Conference of the Parties, First
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Resolution Conf. 1.2 (Berne, Switzerland, 1976)
[hereinafter Conf. 1.2J.
25.

Conf. 1.2 states:

Criteria for deletion or transfer should require positive scientific evidence
that the plant or animal can withstand the exploitation resulting from the
removal of protection. This evidence must transcend informal or lay

evidence of changing biological status and any evidence of commercial trade
which may have been sufficient to require the animal or plant to be placed
on an appendix initially.
Such evidence should include at least a well documented population survey,
an indication of the population trends of the species, showing recovery.
sufficient to justify deletion, and an analysis of the potential for commercial
trade in the species or population.
WIJNSTEKERS, supra, note 7, at 17 (quoting Conf. 1.2.).
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criteria for listing and de-listing became asymmetrical and the criteria for
de-listing were no longer the mirror image of the criteria for listing.
There are two senses in which Conf. 1.2 effectively made the
criteria more stringent. First, it made the criteria for de-listing more
stringent than they had been before. Second, it made the criteria for listing and
de-listing asymmetrical. The criteria for de-listing now had more requirements than the mirror image of the criteriafor listing.The fact that there were
two ways in which the criteria for de-listing had become "more stringent,"
and only the second of these involved making the criteria asymmetrical,
seems to have been a source of confusion and may be what led to
asymmetrical criteria being mistakenly regarded as precautionary. For it is
at least possible to maintain that making the criteria for de-listing more
stringent than they were before is in accordance with the precautionary
principle. Such a change means that more evidence is required that delisting will not harm the species before de-listing is allowed. But there is no
sense in which having asymmetrical criteria is more precautionary. There
is nothing in the precautionary principle to suggest that the criteria for
ending measures against a possibly damaging practice should not be
symmetrical with the criteria for introducing such measures. It seems that
it is only by confusing the two senses in which Conf. 1.2 made the criteria
for de-listing more stringent, could asymmetric criteria be thought of as
precautionary.
This confusion is probably encouraged by the rationale that Conf.
1.2 offers for asymmetrical criteria. The rationale is that:
[tihe addition to and deletion from the appendices require a
different approach. If an error is made by unnecessarily
placing a taxon on an appendix, the result is the imposition
of a documentation requirement. If, however, the Conference
errs in prematurely removing a plant or animal from protection, or lowering the protection afforded, the result can be the
permanent loss of the resource. If it errs it should be therefore
toward protection of the resource.'
This rationale makes a comparison between two errors: the error
of listing a species when unjustified, and the error of de-listing a species
when unjustified. It is claimed, perhaps not unreasonably, that the latter
error is more serious than the former. But it also implies that the stronger
desire to avoid the latter error provides a reason for asymmetric criteria. It
does not. All it justifies is making the criteria for de-listing more stringent
than they were before. This will be sufficient to make the de-listing error
less likely. It does not provide a reason for simultaneously leaving the

26. Id. (quoting Conf. 1.2).
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criteria for listing unchanged. Indeed, the supposed lack of seriousness of
the first error implies that it would actually be acceptable to simultaneously
make it easier to list species and, therefore, maintain symmetry.
Asymmetric criteria, then, cannot legitimately be characterized as
precautionary, nor are they justified by the rationale offered. A consideration of what would justify asymmetric criteria suggests that they cannot be
defended on any grounds. This can be demonstrated by making a different
comparison between two possible errors. If it was the case that a failure to
list a species when justified was less serious than de-listing a species when
unjustified, then there would be a reason to make the criteria for de-listing
more stringent than the mirror image of the criteria for listing; there would
be a reason for having asymmetric criteria. But there is no reason to think
that the former error is less serious than the latter one and good reason to
regard both errors as possessing the same significance. For each error has
the identical consequence that a species which ought to be listed is not
listed. Since these errors are of equal seriousness, asymmetric criteria are
unreasonable. Thus, it turns out to be a good thing for the precautionary
principle that it does not justify asymmetric criteria. If it did, doubt would
be cast on the reasonableness of the principle itself.
Having dismissed two of the three possible ways in which CITES
might have been thought to be implicitly precautionary prior to 1994, we
can now turn to the explicit endorsement of the principle adopted in Conf.
9.24. Conf. 9.24 provides detailed criteria for changing the lists of species
on Appendices I and II. The resolution attempts to improve on the criteria
supplied by the original articles and subsequent resolutions, and it
explicitly repeals several of those resolutions, including Conf. 1.1 and 1.2
(the "Berne Criteria"). Conf. 9.24 endorsed the precautionary principle in
the following two clauses.
RECOGNISING that by virtue of the precautionary principle,
in cases of uncertainty, the Parties shall act in the best interest
of the conservation of the species when considering proposals for amendment of Appendices I and II;
RESOLVES that when considering any proposal to amend
Appendix I or II the Parties shall apply the precautionary
principle so that scientific uncertainty should not be used as
a reason for failing to act in the best interest of the conservation of the species.'
The second of these formulations of the precautionary principle is
the fuller one; indeed, the first clause says almost nothing about the
27. See Conf. 9.24, supra note 8.
28. Id.
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precautionary principle itself. The second formulation is dearly an instance
of the deliberation-guiding version of the principle. It does not specify that
action should be taken when there is some evidence short of certainty, but
simply states that uncertainty should not be used as a reason for failing to
act. It is less obvious how determinate this formulation is. On the one hand,
while it is dearly concerned with the conservation of species, it appears to
make no assumptions about either the source of threats to conservation or
about the appropriate responses. On the last issue, the resolution simply
requires that uncertainty should not be used as a reason for "failing to act
in the best interest of the conservation of the species."2 This leaves open the
question of what sort of measures would be in the best interest of the
species. On the other hand, the references to Appendices I and II in the first
part of the clause imply that the precautionary principle is to be applied in
the context of the overarching assumptions of CITES. These assumptions
are that international trade is a threat to species conservation, and that
restrictions on trade are the appropriate sort of response to that threat. So,
taking the clause as a whole, it is determinate in roughly the same way as
the implicit formulation in the original articles. Nevertheless, it remains the
case that this explicit version, unlike the implicit version, is deliberationguiding rather than action-guiding.
But in another respect, Conf. 9.24 follows very closely the lead
given by the original treaty. Much of the resolution's substance appears in
the annexes to it. The resolution itself states that these annexes are "an
integral part of the Resolution."" Annexes 1 and 2a set out the detailed
criteria for listing species on Appendices I and II that appear in Article II of
the treaty. They are faithful to the spirit of Article II in that the criteria
require that a species be listed even when the impact of trade is uncertain.3
So, given that a listing on either of the appendices requires some action to
be undertaken, these annexes can be said to offer a re-endorsement of the
implicit commitment to the action-guiding version of the precautionary
principle found in the original articles. Thus, the resolution offers
contradictory signals about whether the deliberation-guiding or the actionguiding version of the principle is to be preferred.
There is a final point to be made about Conf. 9.24. Annex 4 specifies
the conditions required to remove a species from Appendices I and 11.
Under Annex 4, there is a mandatory listing on Appendix II following the

29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. For example, Annex 2a stipulates that a species shall be included on Appendix II if
it is "known, inferred or projectedthat the harvesting of species from the wild for international
trade has or may have a detrimental impact on the species" (emphasis added). Id. annex 2a.
Other parts of Annex 2a and Annex 1 contain instances of similar wording.
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removal of a species from Appendix LMoreover, in order to make this shift
it is not sufficient that the species no longer satisfies the criteria for its
original inclusion on Appendix . It must also satisfy certain additional
criteria. Therefore, Annex 4 mandates asymmetric criteria for listing and

de-listing. Although Conf. 9.24 repealed Conf. 1.2, which originally
introduced asymmetric criteria, the ghost of that earlier resolution lives on
in Annex 4.

Significantly, Annex 4 is entitled "Precautionary Measures." Thus,
if one recognized Conf. 9.24 as partly definitive of the precautionary
principle, it would seem to follow that the principle does require asymmetric listing/de-listing criteria. However, the earlier discussion of asymmetric
criteria provides two reasons for not regarding Annex 4 as partly definitive
of the precautionary principle. First, none of the actual formulations of the
principle justifies asymmetric criteria. Second, asymmetric criteria are,
themselves, unreasonable. The first reason provides grounds for regarding
the title of Annex 4 as misconceived. The second reason provides grounds
for regarding Annex 4 as misconceived.
The issue of the precautionary principle's place in CITES can now
be addressed. It has been argued here that Articles 1I,11 and TV implicitly
embody a determinate, action-guiding version of the precautionary
principle. Since these articles set out how CITES intends to achieve the goal
of species conservation, CITES may to said to be precautionary at its heart.
It was also argued that neither the non-detriment clauses of Articles MI and
IV, nor the asymmetric criteria (introduced by Conf.1.2 and reaffirmed by
Conf. 9.24) are in accordance with the principle. While Conf. 9.24 should
have clarified the situation, it failed to do so. The version explicitly
endorsed in Conf. 9.24, although determinate, is deliberation-guiding
rather than action-guiding. Yet the Annexes of Conf. 9.24 implicitly reendorsed the action-guiding version. This lack of consistency may simply
be an unfortunate by-product of the way decisions are made at CITES
conferences. However, the resulting ambiguity may also be a symptom of
the current debate within CITES about whether it should remain true to its
original assumption that restrictions on trade are the proper response to
threats from international trade. Some argue that CITES now needs to
acknowledge the force of the reasons against this particular remedy and in

32. Annex 4, B.2 states: "Species included in Appendix I should only be considered for
transfer to Appendix H if they do not satisfy the relevant criteria in Annex 1. Even if such
species do not satisfy the relevant criteria in Annex 1, they should be retained in Appendix
I unless they satisfy one of the following criteria..." Id.annex 4, B.2. It then goes on to list five
criteria. See id. Since the criteria listed in Annex 1 are the criteria for listing on Appendix I, it
folows that the criteria for removing a species from Appendix I are more stringent than the
mirror image of the criteria for listing a species on Appendix .
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favor of alternative solutions.O This debate will be touched on later. But,
before that, a further distinction must be drawn.
IV. RULES AND PRINCIPLES
This section considers two different ways in which policy
standards may be interpreted. Ronald Dworkin, in the course of his critique
of legal positivism, makes a distinction between legal rules and legal
principles. This distinction, even when removed from the context in
which Dworkin introduces it, provides a useful analytical tool for
understanding policy standards in general and the precautionary principle
in particular. Moreover, it can be employed without endorsing Dworkin's
own account of the law.'
According to Dworkin, both legal rules and legal principles are
standards that "point to particular decisions about legal obligation in
particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction
they give."' Rules are said to be "applicable in an all-or-nothing sense."37
In the case of valid rules, "[i]f the facts a rule stipulates are given-the
answer must be accepted."' Dworkin gives the example of the baseball
rule that a batter who has three strikes is out. He says that one cannot both
accept that this is an accurate statement of the rule and claim that a batter
who has three strikes is not out.
Legal principles, in contrast, "do not set out legal consequences
that follow automatically when the conditions provided are met. ' Rather,
a principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not
necessitate a particular decision."'"Dworkin gives the example of the
principle that no man may profit from his own wrong. This principle does
not entail that the law never permits a man to profit from the wrongs he
commits. For there may be other principles that recommend the opposite
decision. However, under the relevant circumstances, the principle must
be taken into account. It may be overridden, but that does not violate the

33. This debate is described, from different points of view, in Favre, supra note 14, and
in TIMOTHY M. SWANSON, THE INTERNATIONAL REGuLATION Op ExTiNCTION 216-22 (1994).
34. RONALD DWORION, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977).
35. In making this distinction between rules and principles Dworkin states that he will
be using the term "principle" generically to refer to "principles, policies and other sorts of
standards." Id. at 22. Elsewhere in his work the distinction between principle, in the narrower
sense, and policy is of crucial importance. See id. passim. But this latter distinction is not
relevant to the current discussion.
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id. at 26.
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principle in the same way that a rule is broken if the answer it supplies is
not followed. The principle may have been outweighed by other principles.
As this last sentence indicates, a significant feature of principles is that they
have the dimension of weight Where principles offer conflicting guidance,
they are weighed against each other.
Some rules contain terms that make them function more like
principles. Dworkin mentions the words reasonable, negligent, unjust and
significant and goes on to say that "[e]ach of these terms makes the
application of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon
principles, or policies lying beyond the rule, and in this way makes the rule
itself more like a principle."41 As this suggests, the formulation of the
standard may indicate whether the standard functions as a rule, a principle,
or a principle-like rule. But part of Dworkin's point is that the wording is
not an infallible guide. Discovering how the standard is used within the
system of law is the only sure way to know.
In relation to environmental policy, what is useful about Dworkin's
distinction between rules and principles is that he differentiates between
two sorts of guidance that a given standard provides. If the standard
stipulates what is to be done in certain circumstances, and it does not admit
of exceptions, then it is a rule. If it states a reason which should be
considered in certain circumstances but which need not always prevail,
then it is a principle. Thus, while a principle leaves open the possibility that
the eventual decision about what to do may be legitimately guided by
other standards, the same is not true of a rule. If the decision is not made
in accordance with the rule, but in accordance with other standards, then
the rule has been violated. The next section demonstrates that the question
of whether the precautionary principle functions as a rule or a principle (in
Dworkin's sense) is an issue of the first importance.42 The answer has a
direct bearing on the policy implications of the principle and hence on its
critical assessment.

41. Id. at 28.
42. There is some scope for confusion here since the term "principle" is being used in two
different senses. On the one hand, it appears in the expression "precautionary principle,"
where it is used as a general term for a practical guideline. On the other hand, there is the
more specific, stipulative definition that is provided by Dworkin. See DWORIIN, supranote 34,
at 22. In asking whether the precautionary principle functions as a principle, the term is used
successively in these two senses. That is, the question is whether the precautionary principle
(qua practical guideline) functions as a principle (in Dworkin's sense). It is important to bear
this distinction in mind in the following section.
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V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
This article now turns to the critical assessment of the precautionary principle as it appears in CITES. As established earlier, CITES endorses
two versions of the precautionary principle. Determining whether the
precautionary principle functions as a rule or as a principle is the first step
in assessing each of these versions.
The implicit version present in Articles IT,1I and IV of the original
treaty is both action-guiding and determinate. It seems dear that the treaty
intended those articles to constitute a set of rules rather than a set of
principles. That is, the drafters of the treaty saw those articles not as
identifying reasons that must be taken into account in any deliberation
about wildlife policy, but rather as stipulating what is to be done in certain
specified circumstances. For example, the combination of Articles Hf(1) and
III constitutes a rule stipulating that when a species is threatened with
extinction, international trade must be halted. Interpreted in this way, this
implicit version of the precautionary principle does not allow room for the
consideration of reasons against halting trade, or of alternative means of
achieving the goal of species conservation. The key question is whether, in
the cases that come before CITES, there are either reasons against restricting trade, or alternative and preferable means of achieving species
preservation. If there are, then this implicit version of the precautionary
principle will be open to criticism.
Some of the recent discussions of CITES claim that international
trade in wild species can benefit humans who are in need. For instance, it
is possible that impoverished communities in the Third World can gain
from such trade.' Human benefit thus provides a reason against halting
trade. Another related, but more complex countervailing reason is
provided by the consideration that preventing people from making use of
wildlife increases the incentive to convert the habitat of the wildlife to
agricultural use. Thus, halting trade increases the pressure on wild species
by causing a loss of habitat." These considerations lead to the further claim
that there are alternative means-besides halting trade-of guaranteeing
species conservation. These means may encounter fewer and weaker
countervailing reasons. One proposal frequently suggested is to change the
ownership rights in relation to the species being traded, with the aim of
strengthening the incentives for conservation amongst those who are the

43.

See IUCN REGIONAL OFFICE, IUCN/ROSA ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES SERIES No. 1,

SHARING THE LAND: WILDLFE, PEOPLE, AND DEVELPMEr IN AmrIcA 16 (Kudzai Makombe
ed., 1993).

44. See Tim Swanson, Conserving Biological Diversity, in BLUEPRINT 2: GREENING THE
WORLD ECONOMY 181,196-202 (David Pearce ed., 1991).
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first link in any international trade.45 More complex options involve
combining changes in ownership rights with some form of regulation.
If there is, as there appears to be, some substance to these claims,
it follows that the version of the precautionary principle implicit in the
CITES articles is open to the objection that it ignores considerations that
ought, rationally, to be taken into account. To claim that there may be
countervailing reasons is not to assert that these reasons are present in all
cases. Nor is it even to hold that where they are present such reasons will
always outweigh the case for halting trade. But where they do exist it is
unreasonable to exclude them from consideration. If poor people are
benefiting from the wildlife trade, this is a fact of some ethical significance
and it is in the nature of ethical considerations that they cannot be
legitimately ignored. Moreover, if alternative means exist that actually
serve the goal of species conservation more effectively, and which are also
preferable on other grounds, it would be absurd to ignore them. Yet this is
what the implicit version of the precautionary principle mandates."
The need to take account of countervailing reasons and alternative
is
also relevant to the assessment of the explicit version of the
means
precautionary principle found in Conf. 9.24. It has already been noted that
while this version, on the face of it, is deliberation-guiding and determinate, the annexes to the resolution seem to offer an implicit endorsement
of an action-guiding version of the principle. For the purposes of the
current assessment, this article will treat the Conf. 9.24 version of the
precautionary principle as deliberation-guiding. However, the failure of
CITES to specify whether the adopted version of the principle is a rule or
a principle still makes the assessment of the implications of the Conf. 9.24
version less than clear-cut.
If the Conf. 9.24 version of the precautionary principle is interpreted as a rule, then it follows that uncertainty should never be used as a
reason for not listing a species on Appendix I or II. But Conf. 9.24 would
allow the consideration of other sorts of reasons against taking such action.
This implies that this version is more reasonable than, and in some tension
with, the version of the principle implicit in the original CITES treaty.
However, because the formulation in Conf. 9.24 is also a determinate one

45. See IUCN REGIONAL OFFICE, supra note 43, at 19-30.

46. It is worth emphasizing that the problem does not arise simply because the implicit
version of the precautionary principle is functioning as a rule, not a principle. For it is
conceivable that, if things were different, there would be no countervailing reasons and no
alternative means of achieving the same goal. If this were so, then the rule embodied in the
CITES articles could not be charged with ignoring countervailing reasons and alternative
means. However, the objection being made here is that in the world as it actually is there are
countervailing reasons and alternative means. Thus, the objection is not to rules as such, but
to this particular rule, given that the world is as it is.
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which assumes that the only response to a threat to a species is to list it on
one of the Appendices, it is open to the criticism that it does not allow for
the consideration of alternative means of achieving the goal of species
conservation. This leads to a paradoxical result. For the Conf. 9.24 version
allows that countervailing reasons may be considered, yet those reasons
may themselves imply a course of action other than listing a species on
Appendix I or II as the best policy overall. But the Conf. 9.24 version,
interpreted as a rule, does not allow the consideration of alternative courses
of action to enter deliberation. Thus, the explicit version of the precautionary principle contained in Conf. 9.24, when interpreted as a rule, represents
only a partial, and internally flawed, improvement on the implicit version
of the principle. If, instead, the Conf. 9.24 version was interpreted as a
principle, it would not be open to the criticism that it rules out consideration of alternative options. But, it is then even less consistent with the
version of the principle implicit in the original treaty. Therefore, however
understood, it is inconsistent with the implicit version.
This assessment implies that CITES would be less vulnerable to
criticism if it incorporated a different version of the precautionary
principle. The principle should leave some room for considering both the
reasons against responding to threats with restrictions on international
trade, and the alternative means of achieving species conservation. This is
particularly important in the case of terrestrial wildlife in the Third World
because of the way in which conservation policy there is often bound up
with and impinges upon social issues. There are several versions of the
precautionary principle that would meet these conditions. If interpreted as
a principle rather than a rule, then the conditions will be satisfied whether
it is action-guiding or deliberation-guiding, determinate or indeterminate.
But an interpretation of the principle as a rule would also meet these
conditions if it was deliberation-guiding and indeterminate in respect of the
policy responses which were to be adopted.
It is likely that the argument for the adoption of an open-ended
version of the precautionary principle will face the objection that it will, if
not empty the principle of content, then certainly remove its bite. Objectors
will contend that it is only if the principle has the form of a rule requiring
particular sorts of action to be taken against potentially damaging practices
in specified circumstances that it will have any impact at all. If the
precautionary principle is treated as a principle (rather than a rule) or as a
deliberation-guiding, indeterminate rule, then, in the real world, where
there are so many pressures against conservation, it will be rendered
ineffectual.
Although this objection rests upon a valid point, and does address
a genuine problem, it draws the wrong conclusion. The valid point is that
if the precautionary principle is interpreted in the way that has been
recommended here, it will not require predetermined responses when

Spring 1999]

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLEIN CITES

species are endangered. The genuine problem is that this does leave room
for the principle to be verbally endorsed but actually ignored. Nevertheless,
it is a mistake to conclude that a determinate, action-guiding version,
interpreted as a rule, must be adopted in the sphere of wildlife conservation. For such a rule requires specific policy responses irrespective of the
reasons against those responses and irrespective of the existence of better
alternatives. Terrestrial species conservation is often bound up with
questions of land use and hence with issues of human equity and wellbeing, and these connections must be acknowledged. In situations of this
type there are no short cuts to the solutions of wildlife problems. It is an
illusion to think that policy-making institutions can arrive at appropriate
policies by simply following rule-like, determinate, action-guiding versions
of the precautionary principle.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impression one receives of the place of the precautionary
principle in CITES is likely to be a confused one, and for good reasons. A
variety of claims have been made by commentators about the implicitly
precautionary nature of the convention prior to 1994, and the explicit
endorsement of the principle by the Ninth Conference of the Parties in that
year is ambiguous. The interpretation of the precautionary principle
requires a readiness to make distinctions between different versions of the
principle. What emerges, when these distinctions are deployed, is that the
key articles of the treaty can be regarded as implicitly constituting an
action-guiding, determinate, rule-like version of the precautionary
principle. These articles require that action should be taken against trade
even in the absence of proof that trade is causing harm. In this respect,
CITES is precautionary at its core. However, when CITES explicitly
endorsed the precautionary principle in Conf. 9.24, it adopted a
deliberation-guiding rather than an action-guiding version of the principle.
This was in some tension with the implicit version in the original treaty.
The exact extent of the differences between the two versions was difficult
to gauge because of the doubt about whether the Conf. 9.24 version was to
be treated as a rule or a principle.
The criticism of the action-guiding, determinate, rule-like version
of the precautionary principle implicit in the original CITES treaty focused
on the point that it did not allow for consideration of the reasons against
imposing trade bans nor for alternative policies which might also realize
the goal of species conservation. Since there is a growing recognition of the
reasons against trade bans, and of the alternative ways of ensuring species
conservation, these criticisms have some force. They point towards a
version of the precautionary principle that does not rule out consideration
of countervailing reasons and alternative solutions. Such a version would
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entail that the implementation of the principle would not take the form of
the mechanical application of a rule. Rather, it would be a more openended process, involving evaluative judgments. Some conservationists fear
that this would be open to abuse, but this is a risk that must be guarded
against in other ways if justice is to be done to the complexity, including
the moral complexity, of the issues at hand.
It is worth emphasizing that the key articles of the CITES treaty
embody an implicit version of the precautionary principle. Thus, in
criticizing that implicit version, a criticism has been made of the assumptions that guided the original drafters of the treaty. At that time there
appears to have been a greater consensus that both the problem of species
conservation and its solution were reasonably well defined. The threat
often came from international trade and the solution was to halt such trade.
In this sense the problem was regarded as a technical one. But the criticisms
advanced here flow from the recognition that wildlife issues, particularly
in the Third World, may be bound up with social issues. This makes them
much more complex. The range of policy options is wider and the reasons
for and against each are both more numerous and more varied. According
to this perspective, the problem is far from being a technical one and cannot
be addressed without addressing social and ethical issues. Put differently,
the claim here is that the environmentalist's dictum that one cannot do one
thing at a time applies as much to wildlife conservation as it does to any
other area of human activity.
The lessons of this paper may be applicable elsewhere. Any
discussion of the precautionary principle must acknowledge the multiplicity of formulations that are in circulation. Clarity requires that analytical
distinctions of the sort advanced here be made. Moreover, whenever
environmental problems display the complexity illustrated by the
conservation of terrestrial wildlife, any version of the principle that
prevents the consideration of relevant factors will be open to criticism. This
favors treating the precautionary principle either as a principle rather than
as a rule, or as a deliberation-guiding and indeterminate rule. But, however
understood, the principle should not be treated as a means for circumventing difficult, value-laden decisions.

